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Dr. Andrews was very proud of his central reference facilities and by late 1949 he felt that OCD was on the track of a "far more effective solution to providing analysts with quick retrieval of intelligence information than had ever, anywhere, been achieved before." He devoted 32 pages to a detailed description of the Intellofax System, entitling his monograph "Central Reference Facilities, Status (1 November 1949) and Objectives." The Table of Contents is indicative of the complete coverage of his subject:

Summary  
Glossary (of terms)  
Magnitude of the Problem  
Classification Scheme  
Intellofax System  
Index Files  
Abstract Files  
Highly Specialized Reference Problems

In his usual dynamic approach, Andrews had briefed specialists in ORE on the potentialities of the Intellofax System and how analyst participation in the growth of the file would benefit the system and therefore the whole agency. In other words, he was asking analysts if they would like to contribute <sup>coded</sup> abstracts to the file. He stated that only the specialist could decide which are the important documents bearing upon his field of his specialty, and only the specialist could write competent abstracts of such documents. His approach was to the NEA Division of ORE first, because he knew the Division Chief well. In January of 1949 the [REDACTED] began selecting and abstracting

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those documents bearing on [REDACTED] which they regarded as most important. The theory was that if the system could be made to work satisfactorily for the [REDACTED] 25X6A abstracts, then it could possibly be extended to ~~other~~ specialists on other areas. OSI commenced operations on the same trial basis and 25X6A in February, the [REDACTED] desk of ORE in March, OCD meanwhile continued to write abstracts of the table of contents type needed for publications covering a wide variety of subjects and areas. On pages 23 and 25 of the Intellofax study, Dr. Andrews provided samples of OCD, ORE and OSI abstract cards.

*Handwritten notes:*  
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(History repeats itself)  
providing input to CTS  
on an experimental basis  
GTT (Gulf Technology)  
and 25X6A

A so-called contributor code was punched into column 21 of the IBM card so that if <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ specialists <sup>ever</sup> wanted to retrieve only <sup>his</sup> ~~their~~ own abstracted material <sup>he</sup> ~~they~~ could do so.

had in itself yielded a number of unforeseen but highly valuable by-products, such as: (a) time saved in producing weekly and monthly summaries. A carbon copy of the abstract sheet was filed in folders in strictly chronological order and provided the desk chief a fully documented history of day-to-day events in the two countries; (b) training of junior professionals was improved, speeded up and thoroughly locked into the production system by the assignment of writing abstracts; (c) technically difficult reports no longer went into the "hold" basket, but were analyzed, researched and abstracted; (d) file space was saved, since the abstract could replace the original report. ~~(This latter (d))~~

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by ~~product~~ of the abstract program was the basis for a ~~memo~~ directive

from Ad/ORD ~~██████████~~ to all ORD analysts <sup>2 years later</sup> in 1951 to reduce their

25X6A

files, ~~Intellex~~ and to contribute abstracts to

~~the System~~ ~~██████████~~ ~~had already~~ desks of ~~██████████~~ ~~had already~~

joined the program in January and February of 1950 as had Agriculture/EE Division

(in May 1950.) ~~Some of these desks wanted their own filing~~  
~~system based on the Intelligence Subject Code.~~

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rapid growth of the abstract files as contributed by the

~~██████████~~ desks was cause for

Much as he had fostered and approved the abstract program,  
~~even in November 1949~~

Dr. Andrews became concerned about the rapid growth of the abstract

files. <sup>By the end of the year there were 18,047 abstracts (ORD-2847; ORE-6245; OSI-6755)</sup> He reported that on November 1 there were 17,500 abstracts

~~and that~~ they were growing at a staggering rate. He warned that

each extension of the system to a new group of specialists

involved difficult adjustments, revisions, and expansions in the  
~~and~~ required more typists

Classification Scheme, and could be accomplished only by day-to-day

hard work. How true! The Chief of the Analysis Branch spent a

large proportion of her time in 1949 and 1950 working on changes

25X6A

and expansions to the ISC to satisfy the needs of these new

contributors. Area codes for ~~██████████~~

were expanded to take care of provincial divisions. This later on

created some ~~serious~~ problems because they were never used for

retrieval in the overall Intellex system. Dr. Andrews was

concerned that more typists and classification people would

be needed if the abstract program grew too fast.

Dr Andrews concluded the Summary to his study with

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these pertinent words:

"Because of the selectivity being exercised in building up the abstract files, we are forging a tool which in years ahead will enable us to drain off from the Library those documents which are of scant importance, thus making room for the current inflow and ensuring that reports of real importance are held available. It is quite possible that the central reference system being build by CIA will ultimately prove the most important central intelligence service which the Agency provides."

The abstract program mushroomed from its beginnings in 1949 reaching a crescendo in the early 1950's. The desks of NEA joined the program in 1950 as did Agriculture/EE Division. Some of these desks even set up their filing systems according to the ISC. Other divisions or branches began to contribute in 1951 on the

encouragement of [redacted] AD for ORR for that one year, who was interested in space saving. However, the downward trend began thereafter as specialists in ORR and OSI were not interested in spending their time learning how to use the Intelligence Subject Code correctly for in-depth indexing. OSI/Physics and Chemistry contributed more abstracts than any other OSI components and it ceased doing so in 1955. ORR/Shipbuilding was the last ORR component to stop input in 1958.

OCD management had always hoped that these contributions by the specialists would preclude the indexing of these same documents by the OCD indexers. This was never possible, for the specialists frequently abstracted and coded only that part of the document that interested them. There was never any guarantee that the entire document would be covered. So duplication continued; both IBM cards would turn up on a machine run if the same codes had been used (and there was no guarantee of this, either). In such a case, the OCD indexer or librarian in screening the cards before an Intellofax tape was made

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would pull out the non-abstracted card. A great danger to the system later surfaced when the abstract program had stopped. References turned up on machine runs which could not be retrieved any longer, such as articles in Russian scientific journals indexed by OSI and later destroyed. No limit as to source material had been placed on the specialist who was willing to abstract. In the mid 1960's (exact date unknown) all IBM cards with the contributor code were pulled and destroyed for they added nothing to the Intellofax file ~~add~~, but rather created retrieval difficulties.

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Use by Specialists in ORE and OSI

(from Dr. Andrews paper on Central Reference Facilities  
Status 1 Nov 49 and Objectives)

page 4

Rapid growth of the abstract files is cause for administrative concern. Each extension of the system to a new group of specialists involves difficult adjustments, revisions and expansions in the Classification Scheme. Any attempt to extend the system simultaneously to all ORE specialists would create chaotic confusion in the Classification Scheme and thus destroy all chance of developing a system satisfactory to all concerned. Evolution, not revolution, is called for.

page 5

Because of the selectivity being exercised in building up the abstract files, we are forging a tool which in years ahead will enable us to strain off from the Library those documents which are of scant importance, thus making room for then current inflow and ensuring that reports of real importance are held available.

It is quite possible that the central reference system being built by ~~the~~ CIA will ultimately prove the most important central intelligence service which the Agency provides.

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